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Abstract 
This paper discusses solutions derived from lottery experiments using two alternative 
assumptions: that people perceive wealth changes as absolute amounts of money; and that 
people consider wealth changes as a proportion of some reference value dependant on the 
context of the problem under consideration. The former assumption leads to the design of 
Prospect Theory, the latter - to a solution closely resembling the utility function hypothesized 
by Markowitz (1952). This paper presents several crucial arguments for the latter approach 
and provides strong arguments for rejecting the Prospect Theory paradigm. 
 
JEL Classification: C91, D03, D81, D87.  
 
Keywords: Prospect / Cumulative Prospect Theory, Probability Weighting Function, Marko-
witz Hypothesis, Relative Utility Function, Weber’s Law, Decision Making Under Risk.  
 
1. Introduction 
 1.1. Prospect Theory (Kahneman, Tversky, 1979), and its Cumulative version (Tver-
sky, Kahneman, 1992), which describes decision making under conditions of risk and uncer-
tainty, is an alternative to Expected Utility Theory, a hypothesis which has dominated main-
stream economic thought since the middle of the twentieth century. Prospect Theory asserts 
that people are more concerned with changes in wealth than its overall value when making 
decisions involving small sums of money. Anticipated gains and losses, expressed as mone-
                                                 
1 I would like to thank Prof. Harry Markowitz for his helpful and valuable comments expressed in private corre-
spondence and during our almost day long meeting on August 14, 2009 in San Diego, CA.  
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tary amounts, are then used to evaluate the prospects under consideration. However, a prob-
ability weighting function is additionally required for this purpose.   
The present paper questions the assumption that people treat gains and losses as abso-
lute values when making decisions under conditions of risk. On the contrary, it asserts that 
gains and losses are perceived in a context which is determined by the way in which the prob-
lem is framed and which depends on how attention is focused on it. The result is that gains 
and losses are perceived in relation to a reference value which, most frequently, is the maxi-
mum prospect outcome.  
1.2. The paper discusses solutions derived from lottery experiments using two alterna-
tive assumptions: that people perceive wealth changes as absolute amounts of money; and that 
people consider wealth changes as a proportion of the maximum lottery outcome. The former 
assumption leads to the design of Prospect Theory, the latter to a solution closely resembling 
the utility function hypothesized by Markowitz (1952).  
This paper presents several important arguments in support of the latter approach, the 
major one being that people regard changes in wealth in a relative way is founded on Weber’s 
Law - one of the fundamental laws of psychophysics. This law contradicts the absolute notion 
of wealth changes. This observation has also been confirmed by modern researchers including 
Kahneman, Tversky (1984) and Thaler (1985, 1999) since the introduction of Prospect The-
ory.  
Second, an analysis of lottery experiments assuming the absolute notion of wealth 
changes requires the concept of probability weighting to be incorporated into the descriptive 
model. Analyzing gains and losses in a relative way, however, eliminates the need for the 
probability distortion concept.  
Finally, the absolute notion of gains and losses leads to ambiguous solutions. Many 
theories, each proposing a completely different explanation of people’s behavior, may be de-
rived from the same set of experimental data. As a result, two contradictory explanations, one 
claiming that people are generally risk seeking, the other that they are generally risk averse, 
are sometimes even equally likely when deriving the solution using the probability weighting 
concept.  
1.3. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Point 2 shows that treating 
gains and losses as absolute monetary amounts requires the concept of probability weighting 
to describe the experimental results. Moreover, it leads to multiple theories being derived 
from the same set of experimental data. Point 3 presents fundamental observations attesting 
the perception of gains and losses in context rather than in an absolute way. This allows the 
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experimental data to be explained without recourse to a probability weighting function. Such 
an explanation is presented in Point 4. Point 5 presents a relative utility function which can be 
hypothesized using the results presented in Point 4. Point 6 summarizes the article. 
 
2.  Absolute Notion of Wealth Changes 
2.1. Consider the following set of experiments2: 
Experiment 1: Would you prefer to enter a lottery with a 50% chance of winning ei-
ther $100 or $0, or to receive a payment of $50? Most respondents would prefer to receive 
the certain payment. 
Experiment 2: Would you prefer to enter a lottery with a 50% chance of winning ei-
ther $200 or $0, or to receive a payment of $100? Most respondents would prefer the certain 
payment. 
Experiment 3: Would you prefer to enter a lottery with a 50% chance of winning ei-
ther $400 or $0, or to receive a payment of $200? Most respondents would prefer the certain 
payment. 
Analogous experiments can be repeated for other monetary amounts in order to “scan” 
a hypothetical utility function over a broad range of outcomes. Because the responses invaria-
bly indicate a preference for certain payments, researchers conclude that people are averse to 
risk. This is why their utility curve is assumed to be concave whatever the outcome under 
consideration. 
 2.2. Consider the following further set of experiments: 
Experiment 4: Would you prefer to enter a lottery with a 10% chance of winning $500 
and $0 otherwise, or to receive a payment of $50? Most respondents would prefer the lottery. 
Experiment 5: Would you prefer to enter a lottery with a 10% chance of winning 
$1000 and $0 otherwise, or to receive a payment of $100? Most respondents would prefer the 
lottery. 
Experiment 6: Would you prefer to enter a lottery with a 10% chance of winning 
$2000 and $0 otherwise, or to receive a payment of $200? Most respondents would prefer the 
lottery. 
The respondents in these cases exhibit risk seeking behavior and, interestingly, for the 
same certain payment amounts ($50, $100, and $200) as in Experiments 1 - 3. Researchers 
                                                 
2 These are mental experiments only. However similar experiments have been conducted by numerous authors 
including Kahneman, Tversky (1979, 1992), and Gonzales, Wu (1999). CPT’s parameters have been estimated 
basing on the results of two-outcome lotteries. Gonzales and Wu proceeded in a similar way. 
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conclude that people are generally risk averse (as demonstrated in Experiments 1 - 3) in these 
situations as well, but that there has to exist an additional effect related to the perception of 
probabilities in order to explain the risk-seeking behavior observed in Experiments 4 - 6. This 
effect would have to rely on a non-linear perception of probabilities and especially on an 
overweighting of low ones. This reasoning thus leads to a theory in which there exists a non-
linear probability weighting function in addition to a utility function. This is how Prospect 
Theory (and other theories using a similar approach) developed. 
2.3. There is so far no reason to reject this solution. However, there is no reason why 
these experiments could not have been conducted in the reverse order to arrive at the very 
opposite conclusions. Researchers could well have concluded that people are generally risk-
seeking on the strength of Experiments 4 - 6 and argued that their utility function should be 
convex over the entire range of outcomes under consideration. The risk-aversion observed in 
Experiments 1 – 3 would again find its explanation in a non-linear probability weighting, only 
this time the low probabilities would be perceived accurately whereas probabilities around 0.5 
would be heavily underweighted.  
Such an explanation would also utilize both the utility and probability weighting func-
tions. But a very different theory would result with both curves differing in shape from those 
in the first theory. Both theories would have the same ability to describe (or rather to fit) the 
experimental results, albeit with completely different modi operandi. The fact that changing 
the sequence of reasoning steps changes the resulting explanation is then a very serious signal 
that this approach is unsound. 
2.4. Moreover, the researchers could have started with yet another probability of win-
ning the main prize somewhere between 0.1 and 0.5. Having conducted a series of experi-
ments, they would have devised another theory, this time stating that people are generally risk 
neutral over the broad range of outcomes. This theory would, however, require yet another 
shape of the probability weighting function in order to fit the experimental results.  
This shows that an unlimited number of such theories could be derived from the same 
set of experimental data. As a result, we cannot vouch for the correctness of any conclusion 
arrived at by utilizing this line of reasoning3.  
                                                 
3 Gonzales and Wu (1999) offer the best example of this. Their “On the Shape of the Probability Weighting 
Function” paper is commonly regarded as one of the major contributions to Prospect Theory and is therefore 
frequently cited in the literature on the subject. This is due to the fact that it provides a deeper insight into the 
psychology of the probability weighting function while discussing several of its characteristics such as curvature 
(which is explained using the discriminability concept met in the psychophysics literature) and elevation (which 
is interpreted as the attractiveness of a game to a particular subject). The authors go so far as to state that: “there 
appear to be two logically independent psychological properties that characterize the weighting function”. The 
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3. Relative Notion of Wealth Changes 
3.1. The foregoing reasoning assumed the absolute notion of wealth changes. This 
means that gains and losses were represented and analyzed as monetary amounts (such as $50, 
$100, or $200). This is one of the basic assumptions of Prospect Theory and is best expressed 
by a value function which supposedly determines the value (utility) of specific amounts of 
money to people4.  
People, however, typically consider wealth changes in a relative way. This means that 
gains and losses are usually perceived as a proportion of a reference value which depends on 
the context of the problem5. This observation is not new and was also noticed by Kahneman 
and Tversky in 1984, i.e. 5 years after the introduction of Prospect Theory6. Despite this, the 
absolute notion of gains and losses remained the underlying assumption of Cumulative Pros-
pect Theory, which appeared in 1992.  
3.2. The explanation that people regard changes of wealth in a relative way is founded 
on basic psychophysical laws. In the first half of the nineteenth century, German researcher 
Ernst Weber conducted experiments on determining the Just Noticeable Difference in weight 
between objects and concluded that this difference is twice as great with a 2 kg object than 
with a 1 kg object. The law Weber formulated in 1834 states that this difference is a constant 
                                                                                                                                                        
most interesting statement is however to be found in Footnote 11: “There was a high multicolinearity between 
the elevation of the probability weighting function … and the exponent of the value function. ….These two pa-
rameters correlated -0.98. …The curvature parameter for the probability weighting function and the exponent of 
the value function …correlated … -0.66. The two-parameter Prelec function also exhibited high multicolinearity 
between the elevation parameter and the α parameter (0.97).” This high multicolinearity simply means that the 
value and probability weighting functions are very strongly interdependent and they contain pretty much the 
same information about the phenomena described. The model is not statistically robust as a result. This can be 
avoided by dropping some of the descriptive variables. In this case, however, it may mean dropping one of the 
descriptive functions. Additionally, none of the “psychological” considerations regarding the shape of the value 
and probability weighting functions appear to have any special significance. 
4 According to Cumulative Prospect Theory the value function is defined as ( ) αλ xxv = , where x is the gain or 
loss expressed as an absolute monetary amount. 
5 To make it absolutely clear: Prospect Theory asserts that people consider changes in wealth rather than its 
overall value and introduces the concept of gains and losses expressed as absolute amounts of money. This may 
be referred to as the “absolute notion of wealth changes”. It is additionally assumed in this paper that those 
wealth changes (e.g. gains and losses) are perceived as proportions (percentages) of a reference value determined 
by the context of the problem under consideration. This is referred to as the “relative notion of wealth changes”. 
6 Kahneman and Tversky consider a minimal, topical, and comprehensive account in their “Choices, Values, and 
Frames” paper. They state: A topical account relates the consequences of possible choices to a reference level 
that is determined by the context within which the decision arise and conclude: People will spontaneously frame 
decisions in terms of topical accounts. … The topical organization of mental accounts leads people to evaluate 
gains and losses in relative rather than in absolute terms (emphasis added). The idea of mental accounts actually 
originated with Thaler (1985, 1999). 
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proportion of the initial stimulus magnitude7. This is now one of the fundamental laws of psy-
chophysics (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2009): 
 DS / S = k        
where DS is the Just Noticeable Difference, S is the initial stimulus magnitude and k is a con-
stant. This law holds with reasonable accuracy for most stimuli within a broad range. For ex-
ample, the value of k is 2% for weight, 4.8% for loudness and 7.9% for brightness. It follows 
from the Weber law that the same change in stimulus (for instance 0.2 kg) can be strongly 
felt, slightly noticed or not perceived at all depending on the magnitude of the initial stimulus. 
It further follows that an unambiguous and absolute perception level of a specific stimulus 
change cannot be determined, as this depends on the situational context. 
 3.3. How the Weber Law works for financial stimuli will be presented with the follow-
ing example: 
 Problem 1a: What is the smallest significant amount of money to a person shopping for 
goods worth about $100? 
This will possibly be close to 1 dollar (but not as small as 1 cent). Such a person may, 
for example, consider choosing a rival product that is $0.5 cheaper. 
Problem 1b: What is the smallest amount of money considered by the same person 
purchasing a house for $500,000? 
This will probably be at least $1,000. A purchase offer of $479,538 is hard to imagine; 
$480,000 seems far more likely. It follows that one dollar, a significant amount in the former 
case, is completely insignificant in the latter. Even $100, the sum total of a person’s expendi-
ture in a shop, is of no significance in a house purchase.  
3.4. The foregoing example demonstrates that the human mental system adapts itself 
to financial quantities, just as its sensory system does to physical ones. The result is that the 
Just Noticeable Difference remains an approximately constant proportion of different finan-
cial amounts. This means that when considering financial prospects (projects, investments, 
lotteries etc.), the size of the prospect becomes a reference value in the entire mental process, 
rendering an absolute amount of money (say $10) relevant or irrelevant depending on the con-
text. This conclusion constitutes a fundamental deviation from Prospect Theory, which re-
gards gains and losses in absolute terms, and attempts to derive a value function in terms of 
absolute monetary amounts8. 
                                                 
7 An extension of the Weber Law is the Weber-Fechner Law, which was formulated in 1860 and describes the 
logarithmic perception of stimuli.  
8 This does not even seem possible according to the Weber law. 
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4.  Solution Resulting From Relative Notion of Wealth Changes 
4.1. In point 2, we demonstrated how the consideration of gains and losses in absolute 
terms inevitably leads to the concept of probability weighting. We further demonstrated that 
this approach produces ambiguous results.  Many theories can be derived from the same set of 
experimental data, each theory having the same ability to describe (fit) the experimental re-
sults. We will now show that considering gains and losses as relative values allows the ex-
perimental results to be explained without the probability weighting concept and leads to a 
single, unambiguous solution.  
 4.2. The results of the Experiments 1-6 can be explained differently by assuming that 
people perceive outcomes as proportions of the main payment. No “scanning” of the utility 
function is performed for the various outcomes in Experiments 1 - 3 because the amount of 
the certain payment is always half that of the main payment. All three questions therefore deal 
with the value of the utility function for the relative outcome of r = 0.5. The conclusion from 
these three experiments is that people are risk-averse for this particular relative outcome, so 
the utility function is concave at this point. But this conclusion only concerns this one point. 
Repeating similar experiments for different outcome values would still only inform us about 
this single point of the curve expressed in terms of relative outcomes. 
 Similarly, Experiments 4 - 6 show that people exhibit a risk-seeking attitude by their 
preference for the lottery over a relative outcome of r = 0.1. The utility function is therefore 
convex at this point. Once again, this conclusion is only valid for this single point. This line of 
reasoning leads to the plotting of a utility function expressed for relative outcome values, 
which is partially convex and partially concave. This would certainly be a completely differ-
ent solution from that proposed by Prospect Theory, all the more so since it would not utilize 
any probability weighting function.  
4.3. The foregoing reasoning may be repeated for losses as well. Consider the follow-
ing set of 3 experiments (the outcomes in parentheses correspond with the respective experi-
ment numbers): 
Experiment 7 (8, 9): Would you prefer to enter a lottery with a 90% chance of losing 
$100 ($200, $400) and $0 otherwise, or to pay $90 ($180, $360) to avoid the game? Most 
respondents would prefer the lottery. 
Consider now the following further set of 3 experiments: 
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Experiment 10 (11, 12): Would you prefer to enter a lottery with a 10% chance of los-
ing $900 ($1800, $3600) and $0 otherwise, or to pay $90 ($180, $360) to avoid the game? 
Most respondents would prefer to pay the certain amount. 
The respondents in Experiments 7 – 9 exhibit risk seeking behavior, whereas the re-
spondents in Experiments 10 - 12 exhibit risk aversion behavior for exactly the same certain 
payment amounts ($90, $180, and $360). As in case of gains, considering losses in absolute 
terms requires a probability weighting function to be incorporated into the descriptive model. 
Similarly, the order of the reasoning steps influences the conclusion regarding the general 
attitude to risk. Beginning with Experiments 7 - 9 leads to the conclusion that people are gen-
erally risk seeking and that a probability weighting function is required to explain the risk 
aversion observed in Experiments 10 - 12. Conversely, beginning with Experiments 10 - 12 
leads to the conclusion that people are generally risk averse and that a  probability weighting 
function is required to explain the risk seeking attitude observed in Experiments 7 - 9.  
Once again, it follows that completely different modi operandi result from both ap-
proaches with the value and probability weighting functions assuming different shapes in each 
case. Which solution truly explains the behavior of the respondents is therefore a fair ques-
tion. The situation becomes even more embarrassing once we notice that the probabilities 
10% and 90% are symmetrically located on the probability scale and that neither should be 
preferred over the other when choosing the sequence of reasoning steps. We are therefore 
inexorably drawn to the paradoxical conclusion that both solutions (one claiming that people 
are generally risk seeking, another that they are generally risk averse) are equally likely on the 
basis of Experiments 7 - 12.   
4.4. Analyzing the experimental results using the relative notion of losses leads to a 
completely different and unambiguous result. Experiments 7 - 9 lead to the conclusion that 
people are risk seeking for the relative loss of r = 0.9, whereas Experiments 10 - 12 lead to the 
conclusion that people are risk averse for the relative loss of r = 0.1. No probability weighting 
function is required to explain the results of these experiments. 
 
5. Relative Utility Function 
5.1. The shape of the utility function, expressed in terms of relative outcomes, can 
now be hypothesized using the results presented in Point 4. The solution is presented in Fig.1.  
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Fig. 1.  The relative utility function. 
 
The curve should be concave for high relative gains, reflecting the risk aversion ob-
served in Experiments 1-3, and convex for low relative gains, reflecting the risk seeking atti-
tude observed in Experiments 4-6.  
The picture is reversed for losses. The function should be convex for high relative 
losses, reflecting the risk seeking attitude observed in Experiments 7 - 9, and concave for low 
relative losses, reflecting the risk aversion observed in Experiments 10 – 12.  
The double-S shape of this hypothetical relative utility function offers a simple and 
concise explanation of risk-seeking and risk-aversion attitudes when making decisions under 
conditions of risk. This replaces the “fourfold pattern” of risk attitude formulated by Cumula-
tive Prospect Theory. This solution is unambiguous and does not require a probability weight-
ing function to describe the pattern. 
The curve should be of greater magnitude for losses than for gains as people are gen-
erally averse to loss. 
5.2. Quite surprisingly, the obtained curve strongly resembles the utility function hy-
pothesized by Markowitz (1952) and shown in Figure 2.  
 
Fig. 2. The shape of the utility function according to the Markowitz hypothesis of 1952. 
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The only significant difference with the Markowitz curve is that the relative utility 
function is defined for relative values of outcomes rather than for absolute ones.   
 
6. Summary. 
This paper discusses solutions derived from lottery experiments using two alternative 
assumptions: the absolute and relative notion of wealth changes. Several important advan-
tages of the latter approach have been presented in the paper. Most importantly, people do 
consider changes of wealth in a relative way. This was even confirmed by Kahneman and 
Tversky – the authors of Prospect Theory.  
However, introducing this assumption into an analysis of the experimental data leads 
to the rejection of Prospect Theory itself. The concept of probability weighting – one of the 
key planks of Prospect Theory – becomes unnecessary when gains and losses are considered 
in a relative way.  
It was shown that retaining the concept of probability weighting leads to multiple solu-
tions being derived from the same set of experimental data. A paradox was presented that two 
contradictory explanations - one claiming that people are generally risk seeking, the other that 
they are generally risk averse - might even be equally likely if probability weighting is util-
ized. 
The relative notion of wealth changes leads to a completely different and unambiguous 
solution, one which strongly resembles the utility function hypothesized by Markowitz 
(1952).  
This paper strictly demarcates the two approaches as the relative and absolute notions 
are mutually exclusive. As a result Prospect Theory cannot be held to be an accurate explana-
tion of people’s behavior while gains and losses are simultaneously held to be perceived in a 
relative way.  
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